In this article, we use Statsbomb data to analyse how much space Italian teams are allowing their opponents in the 2025/26 season.
Modern football has moved away from the idea of the classic chess match, built on waiting, reflection and slower rhythms. The pitch has become a frenetic environment in which there is ever less time to think, and every decision must be taken in a fraction of a second.
Much of this evolution has come through the pursuit of man-to-man duels, which turn the game into a series of continuous, full-pitch confrontations. In this context, as Luciano Spalletti argues, the management of space is no longer based on the ability to find a man between the lines, but on the ability to move between bodies.
However, this is not the only path. While many teams push man-marking to its extremes, alternative ideas continue to exist which, while embracing modern intensity, seek different solutions: ones less tied to pure individual duels and more oriented towards collective coverage or a different management of the game’s flows. This variety of approaches makes the reading of micro-spaces even more complex.
The image you see offers a snapshot of the defensive tactical DNA of Serie A in the 2025/26 season. Thanks to data from Hudl Statsbomb—the world’s most advanced football data—we can observe how Italian teams interpret the out-of-possession phase, responding to a fundamental question: “How much space is conceded to the opponent?”
In other words, what is not measured directly is the intensity or quality of pressing, but rather the space and time allowed at the moment of reception. It could be said that this captures a set of choices: when to step up, where to step up, and where to wait.
To assess how much space is conceded, the average distance of the nearest defender when an opposing player receives the ball is measured: if the square in question is deep red, it means very little space is left to the receiver; if it is darker gray, it means a great deal of space is conceded to the player receiving the ball, compared to the average in the league.
Even at first glance, it is clear that Serie A is a heterogeneous league, certainly more varied in its approaches than is often assumed — especially given how frequently it is accused of excessive uniformity.
At the same time, it is only natural that teams with different ambitions adopt different approaches: stronger sides generally seek to impose control over matches through intense pressing, while less well-equipped teams are willing to concede more space and time to the opponent in order to gain compactness and defensive solidity. However, as we will see, this distinction is not always so clear-cut.
For the sake of simplicity, teams can be divided into five categories (though each category could be further broken down into additional subcategories):
Teams that apply immediate and widespread pressure on the opponent, systematically reducing the space conceded in possession: Bologna, Como, Roma, Atalanta;
Teams that concede little space to the opponent during the build-up from deep, but then prefer to become more compact once the ball enters their own half. However, leaves teams vulnerable if opponents break through high press, as more space to play in behind: Genoa, Inter, Juventus, Napoli, Parma;
Teams that concede space and time to the opponent during the build-up from deep, before increasing aggression and intensity in their own half: Cagliari, Fiorentina, Verona;
Teams with a predominantly reactive approach, namely those that tend to concede space and time to the opponent in possession across all areas of the pitch: Milan, Cremonese, Lazio, Pisa, Torino;
Hybrid teams that do not offer clear indications, or that prefer to alternate between a more proactive and a more reactive approach depending on the side of the pitch: Lecce, Sassuolo, Udinese.
In short, Serie A 2025/26 shows a plurality of approaches to the out-of-possession phase that goes beyond the stereotypes of a purely reactive league.
This variety of approaches is not merely a tactical curiosity, but reflects how Italian football is evolving in its relationship between risk and control. Managing space is always also about managing danger: is it better to step up immediately to reduce the opponent’s thinking time, risking exposure to runs in behind, or is it better to wait in order to protect the structure while accepting the concession of the initiative?
These maps should not, of course, be read as static photographs, but as indicators of behaviour repeated over time. Some teams show remarkable consistency regardless of the opponent; others vary their approach significantly depending on the context: scoreline, phase of the match, characteristics of the opposition.
Bologna probably represent the most linear and easily recognisable case in the entire sample. The map shows a systematic reduction of space at the moment of reception in almost every area of the pitch, signalling a defensive idea that allows for no genuine phases of waiting. Closing down on the man is not a reaction to the opponent’s action, but a prerequisite.
What stands out is not only the height or intensity of the press, but the continuity of the behaviour: Italiano’s side defend compactly, defend on the front foot and, one might say, defend on bodies. Every opposition reception is attacked in order to drastically reduce the time available.
This approach entails a high number of individual duels and constant exposure to opposition rotations, but it is offset by strong collective coherence: the team accepts risk as an integral part of the model.
In this sense, the rossoblù embody one of the most radical and modern interpretations of the out-of-possession phase in Serie A — a team that systematically denies time and space to the opponent as an identity principle, in a manner similar to Como and Roma.
Bologna’s pressing actions under Italiano, above the league average.
Nonetheless, some slight differences emerge compared to Como. The Lariani’s map shows a tendency to remove time from the opponent first in wide areas (where the opposing full-backs usually operate) and then in central zones.
This happens because in the 4-2-3-1 designed by Fàbregas the wingers apply pressure that directs play infield, where there is greater density and where it is, therefore, easier to regain the ball. The result is a form of aggression that is less individual and more zonal, oriented towards controlling passing lanes as well as removing time from the ball carrier.
Milan: Structural Protection and Reactive Control
Milan, by contrast, fall into the group of teams with a predominantly reactive approach (the only one among those at the top of the table), with a map that shows a systematic concession of space and time at the moment of reception in almost every area of the pitch, excluding the penalty area.
The choice is to protect the structure above all else: the rossoneri defence tends to avoid aggressive step-outs far from their own box, prioritising the protection of depth and the maintenance of distances. The idea is to reduce the risk of being attacked in behind or between the lines, even at the cost of conceding the opponent more time to manage possession.
In this sense, Milan represent a defensive model that forgoes influencing the opponent’s initial build-up phase in order to focus on defending key zones, accepting a more patient, waiting-based game.
Allegri’s Milan display a very different map and demonstrate that a more patient approach can still work.
Inter: Pressing by Phases
While Bologna and Milan represent opposite ends of the tactical spectrum, most Serie A teams operate somewhere in between, negotiating the balance between risk and control.
One example is Chivu’s Inter, who seek to deny opponents time and space when they attempt to build from the back, especially inside their own penalty area, as in goal-kick build-up situations.
However, once the first line of pressure is bypassed, the behaviour changes markedly: the defensive line gradually drops, distances between units are reduced and the priority becomes protecting the central zone rather than immediately regaining the ball.
The map therefore depicts a team that does not press continuously, but by thresholds: aggressive at the start of the move, more positional in the intermediate phase, reactive in the final thirty metres. A flexible model alternating high intensity and structural control, with the aim of directing the opponent’s possession rather than chasing it.
Inter’s pressing radar: a team that remains highly aggressive
A similar discussion applies to Conte’s Napoli, who, compared to Inter, prove extremely aggressive throughout the attacking half before gradually conceding more time to the opponent as the defensive line drops.
Cagliari and Verona: Delayed Aggression
Cagliari under Pisacane and Verona under Zanetti (now managed by Sammarco) behave in the opposite way to the nerazzurri: both deliberately concede time and space in the early phases of the opponent’s move, avoiding high pressure so as not to disrupt their structure. Their respective maps show greater permissiveness in the opponent’s attacking half, followed by a clear behavioural shift once the ball settles in their own half.
In the case of Pisacane’s Cagliari, this choice translates into a very orderly mid-to-low block, prioritising protection of the centre and vertical passing lanes. The real aggression is triggered only when the opponent receives between the lines or orients the first touch towards goal: at that moment the midfielders step up decisively and the wide players narrow inside, transforming an apparently passive phase into sudden, collective pressure. The objective is not to regain the ball immediately, but to slow the move, force a lateral pass and buy time to re-compact.
In Verona’s case, one can also note a slight preference for pressing high on the right-hand side, probably the area where they seek to channel the opponent’s possession due to the presence of players better equipped in terms of pressing angles, intensity in duels and ability to engage one-on-one.
Lazio: Ball-Oriented and Trigger-Based
A team different from the others, and for this reason particularly interesting, is Sarri’s Lazio, who concede time to the opponent in every area of the pitch. This is because the biancocelesti adopt an approach oriented not towards the man, but towards the ball.
It is therefore no coincidence that Lazio rank last for PPDA — passes allowed per defensive action — because the idea is to trigger pressure only upon the activation of very precise, codified triggers.
The data provided by Hudl Statsbomb therefore offers a lens that shifts the focus of pressing from how much to how and where. From this perspective, Serie A in 2025/26 reveals a variety of interpretations, in which there is no single solution, but a continuous negotiation between risk and control.
Ultimately, in modern football, the difference between victory and defeat often comes down to these decisions: how much space to concede, and where.
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