In this article, L’Ultimo Uomo uses Statsbomb data to look at the numbers behind Atalanta’s rich tradition of strikers – and whether that is likely to continue in a post-Gasperini era.
There aren’t many certainties in football, but one thing Serie A fans have grown accustomed to in recent years has been Atalanta strikers outperforming expectations.
They might not always be the league’s top scorers, but the likes of Duván Zapata, Luis Muriel and Rasmus Højlund always guaranteed a good number of goals without fail.
And in the case of Mateo Retegui, Atalanta converted the Argentine-born forward from a solid mid-table player into capocannoniere in the space of one season, before pocketing €65million from Saudi Arabian side Al-Qadisah
It has been like this ever since the Bergamo side established themselves as one of the best teams in Serie A. Or at least, it had always been... until this season.
The 2025/26 season is something of a year zero for Atalanta after the departure of the man who changed the club’s history: Gian Piero Gasperini.
To replace him, the club chose one of his protégés, Ivan Jurić. However, it seemed that any continuation between the Croatian and Gasperini would mainly come from a defensive point of view. His teams had never stood out for their attacking output. And so, this summer, Atalanta’s centre-forwards didn’t seem like such a safe bet.
On top of that, their current main man, Gianluca Scamacca, was coming back from an injury that had kept him out for an entire season, while new signing Nikola Krstović was still an unknown quantity at this level.
Jurić’s stint in Bergamo, however, went worse than expected. And so, the Croatian coach was sacked after just 11 league matches.
Atalanta’s Goal and xG difference timeline in Gasperini’s last two seasons and under Jurić
In his place, the management opted for another Gasperini disciple, Raffaele Palladino, a manager with a more attacking approach to his predecessor.
Clearly, with this choice the intention was to recover the original risk-taking spirit of Atalanta in recent years.
It’s no coincidence that the first to benefit from the new coach’s arrival was Scamacca: the Italy international immediately scored with an overhead kick against Napoli and, overall, delivered excellent performances both away to Conte’s side and in the Champions League against Eintracht Frankfurt and Chelsea.
But despite Juric being dubbed a more reactionary, defensive wing of ‘Gasperinismo’, what do the underlying metrics tell us?
Scamacca and Krstović might not have scored many goals under Juric but their shot volume and quality was higher than their absolute numbers suggest, and have continued in the same vein under Palladino.
At the time of writing, Scamacca and Krstović rank first and second in Serie A for shots per 90 with 4.76 and 4.57 respectively, per Statsbomb data. This represents a significant rise for the Montenegrin, who has jumped up from 3.14 (2023/24) and 3.68 (2024/25) at Lecce.
Kristović now rates in the top percentiles for shots, xG, and touches in the box
What’s more, Scamacca’s xG has held pretty firm at around 0.4 per 90, the same as his debut season when he netted 12 goals, while Krstović has risen to 0.64 per 90 from 0.26 last season.
While it’s a fairly natural improvement when moving from a team in the lower part of the table to one that has been qualifying for the Champions League for years now, Krstović’s numbers are not an isolated case but represent the continuation of a phenomenon seen under Gasperini.
Shots Fired
As mentioned, in recent years Atalanta have had the magical ability to exponentially raise the performances of their number nines: not only the starters, but also those coming off the bench. The statistics prove it.
Let’s take the cases of Scamacca and Retegui, who both enjoyed genuine breakthroughs in 2023/24 and 2024/25 in the nerazzurro shirt respectively.
Both players had the best seasons of their careers in Bergamo in terms of scoring average in Serie A: 0.69 non-penalty goals per 90 minutes for Scamacca, and an impressive 0.75 for Retegui.
Part of this goalscoring increase is directly related to the increase in shot volume that strikers experienced when moving to Gasperini’s Atalanta. For example, Retegui arrived in Europe at Gilardino’s Genoa. For him, moving from the rossoblù to Atalanta meant going from 2.3 shots per 90 in 2023/24 to 3.55 per 90 in 2024/25.
Going further back, Duván Zapata showed a huge jump from around 2.2 shots per 90 at Udinese and Sampdoria to four consecutive seasons of 3.4+ – reaching a high of 3.89 – per 90 output at Atalanta.
Compatriot Luis Muriel went from around 2.6 shots per 90 at both Sevilla and Fiorentina in 2018/19, before registering a massive 4.73 per 90 in 2019/20 and 4.85 in 2020/21.
While not at the same level as the two Colombians, Rasmus Højlund saw his 1.90 shots per 90 at Sturm Graz in 2021/22 rise to 2.41 when he joined Atalanta, before dropping back down to 1.44 and 1.36 at Manchester United.
The situation is more nuanced for the other Atalanta striker of recent years, Scamacca, who, before arriving in Bergamo, had already found success at a small but strongly attack-minded club: Alessio Dionisi’s Sassuolo in 2021/22.
In moving from the Emilia-Romagna side to the nerazzurri (with the disappointing spell at West Ham in between), Scamacca has seen an uplift in shot volume, albeit not as pronounced, going from roughly 3 per 90 at Sassuolo to 3.45 in his first season at the Stadio di Bergamo.
Scamacca, then, has performed broadly in line with his past. However, production — the chances he had — represents only the output, the final result of what Atalanta created.
What has truly changed in the move from teams like Sassuolo, Lecce and Genoa to Atalanta, and what shows just how special la Dea has been and continues to be, is the way the ball reaches them and the positions they receive it in. In other words, moving to Atalanta has meant receiving the ball in more dangerous areas.
Quality, not just Quantity
Under Gasperini, Atalanta had a unique ability in Italy to combine technical quality with off-the-ball movement, always geared towards attacking vertically and creating space for whoever received the ball.
Moreover, the nerazzurri were — and still are — among the few Serie A sides boasting attacking players capable of keeping the ball in tight spaces, right on the edge of the box, where it’s easiest to create danger.
Scamacca, then, just like Retegui, owes part of his breakthrough to the fact that he received the ball in better conditions. Both improved their numbers in metrics that indicate more dangerous types of receptions, as per Statsbomb data.
Both Scamacca and Retegui increased their touches inside the penalty area. For the former, from 6.35 in his season at Sassuolo to 10.08 in 2023/24 at Bergamo. For Retegui, he went from 6.24 with Genoa to 11.81 with Atalanta.
The number of line-breaking passes they received in the final third also rose significantly. Through balls should, in theory, make it easier to play a striker into dangerous situations.
At Sassuolo, Scamacca received 5.6 line-breaking passes per 90 minutes in the final 30 metres, of which only 3.11 came with at least two metres of space — a significant margin for freedom. In 2023/24 at Atalanta, however, he received 9.74, of which 5.42 came with two metres of space available.
Retegui at Genoa received 5.15 line-breaking passes per 90 minutes in the final third, of which 1.85 came with two metres of space. Last season in Bergamo, it was 9.48, of which 4.20 came with two metres of space.
Ultimately, this meant Retegui was getting in more dangerous positions to execute higher value chances. This is supported by the numbers. In 2023/24 at Genoa, Retegui averaged an non-penalty xG of 0.09 per shot (2023/24), which jumped up to 0.14 in 2024/25. He also saw his 0.21 post-shot expected goals per 90 minutes rise to 0.53.
Although Scamacca’s NPxG numbers have held pretty steadily from his time at Sassuolo, his PSxG per 90 also rose from 0.55 (2021/22) to 0.62 (2023/24) following his move.
Simply put, with Gasperini at the helm, Atalanta had developed a style of play that encouraged strikers to not just get plenty of shots off, but supplied them with the ammunition they needed and did so in more dangerous areas than their previous clubs.
Continuity or a Change of Style?
With Jurić, the club hoped to have chosen a coach who would maintain similar characteristics.
In fact, regarding through-ball receptions and touches in the box, Scamacca has kept numbers similar to those of 2023/24: 11.92 touches in the box, 9.45 line-breaking passes received in the final third, of which 5.17 came with two metres of space,
Krstović also saw these numbers increase like his predecessors: his maximum at Lecce had been 4.92 line-breaking passes received per 90 minutes in the final third in 2023/24, of which 2.43 came with two metres of space; this year on average he receives 8.94 per 90 minutes in the final third, of which 4.46 come with two metres of space.
So, if the numbers point to Atalanta maintaining their traditional ability to get their strikers into plenty of good shooting positions, why have the two not been prolific so far?
For Scamacca, as mentioned, the main factor can be attributed to returning from injury and suffering a relapse, which practically prevented him from settling in under Jurić, rather than struggling under a massive stylistic shift.
For Krstović, it is perhaps a question of composure. The underlying numbers suggest that, in line with former Atalanta strikers, he is at least getting himself into good scoring positions—with his NPxG/shot rising to 0.14 this year, compared to 0.09 and 0.07 in his last two seasons at Lecce.
The hope is that Palladino can bring back to Bergamo that magic which allowed all forwards to flourish. The signs are there, both in terms of the numbers mentioned and the fresh energy in the air, but it will then be up to Scamacca and Krstović to do their part and fine-tune their finishing. Only time will tell if Atalanta will be able to become the forwards’ El Dorado once again.
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